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B. BRUCE BARE, BRUCE R. LIPPKE &WEIHUAN XU*

Equitably Treating Individual
Washington State Forest Trusts
through Consolidated Management: A
Conceptual Approach
ABSTRACT
This article develops a conceptual approach for managing a
consolidated set of individualforest trusts to meet the fiduciary
responsibilitiesof the trust manager.An important tenet of trust
management is to manage each trust with undivided loyalty.
Consolidatedmanagement of a set of trusts is permissibleso long
as each individual trust benefits, although each need not benefit
equally. Individual trust-by-trust analysis is required to
demonstrate that a consolidatedmanagement plan is beneficial to
each individualtrust and that joint benefits of such management
areequitablydistributed.The approachproposedbelow is discussed
within the context of a consolidated Habitat Conservation Plan
developedfor Washington State'sforestlands.
INTRODUCTION
The Washington State Department of Natural Resources (DNR) is
responsible for managing approximately 2.1 million acres of state
forestlands.' In 1996, a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) covering 1.65
million acres was proposed that provided for incidental take permits for
two federally listed endangered species-the northern spotted owl and the
marbled murrelet. The HCP also proposed to conserve habitat for a
number of unlisted species such as several salmonids and other state and
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1. See WASH. STATE DEP'TOFNATURALREsOURCES, FOREsTREsouR EPLAN: POLICY PLAN
16 (1992) [hereinafter FOREST POLICY PLAN].
2. See WASH. STATE DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, FINAL ENVIRoNMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT. HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN 1.1 to 1.2 (1996) [hereinafter HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLAN].
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federal candidate species.3 DNR's plan was to give "70 to 100 years of
regulatory certainty and sustainable timber harvests by anticipating the
habitat needs of at-risk fish and wildlife species."4 During development of
the HCP, we were asked to review the economic analysis conducted as part
of the HCP planning process.' During this review, some long-standing
issues concerning fiduciary responsibilities associated with the
management of Washington State's forest trust lands resurfaced. In this
article, we address one of these-the advisability of managing individual
trusts under a consolidated management plan such as an HCP. Other
related issues that drew our attention include the DNR's interpretation of
sustained yield timber management as nondeclining harvest flow and the
balance that the HCP would strike between the generation of income for
trust beneficiaries and the protection of the long-term interests of the trusts.
These issues may dramatically affect the economic performance of the
State's forest trusts and are integral components of all DNR management
plans. We discuss these issues before returning to the central thesis of this
article.
Despite many reports that have decried the negative economic
impacts associated with nondeclining harvest flow policies,6 the DNR
continues to embrace them. The Revised Code of Washington (RCW)
defines sustained yield as "management of the forest to provide harvesting
on a continuing basis without major prolonged curtailment or cessation of
harvest."7 DNR forest policy states that "[t]he department's long-standing
policy has been to adopt a more rigorous standard: sustainable, even-flow
harvest."8 Nondeclining harvest flow is slightly more flexible than even
flow, but both prohibit a short-term increase in harvests if they cannot be
maintained at equal or higher levels in the future. As a consequence, forest
trusts with large amounts of over-mature timber are precluded from
drawing down their inventories to sustainable levels. Closely related to the
sustainable harvest policy is the definition of the ownership group for
which a sustainable harvest is determined. Currently, the department

3.

See id.at 1.2.

4. WASH. STATE DEP'TOF NATURAL RESOURCES, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1996).
5. A preliminary review of DNR HCP-related documents indicated that the economic
analysis was not sufficient for the department to conclude that the proposed HCP was in the
best economic interests of the trusts.
6. See B. BRUCE BARE ET AL, DEMONSTRATION OF TRUST IMPACIs FROM MANAGEMENT
ALTERNATIvESTO ACHIEVE HABITAT CONSERVATION GOALSON WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGED LANDS iv (1997). See also STATE OF WASH. JOINT LEGISLATIVE
AUDIT & REVIEW COMM., REPORT No. 96-5, FOREST BOARD TRANSFER LANDS (1996); INDEP.
REVIEW COMM., REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE BOARD OF NATURAL RESOURCES (1995).
7. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.68.030 (West 1991).
8. FOREST POLICY PLAN, supra note 1, at 17.

Summer 2000]

STATE FOREST TRUSTS

determines "timber harvests among the [several] ownership groups.. with
the goal of producing even-flow harvest volumes within each group."'
Thus, harvest levels are computed neither for individual trusts nor for the
total area covered by a management plan such as an HCP. Regarding the
adoption of even-flow harvest policies, an Independent Review Committee
appointed by the Board of Natural Resources concluded that "DNR's evenflow policy, as presently construed, may unduly inhibit DNR's ability to
generate revenues on behalf of trust beneficiaries." 0 The Committee went
on to state that "[i]n our view the even-flow policy may very well conflict
with the trustee's fiduciary obligation to the beneficiaries.""1 Both DNR's
interpretation of the legal definition of sustained yield as well as the
specification of the geographic unit for which a harvest schedule is
calculated are disputable. We believe that the common law principle of
undivided loyalty requires that a harvest plan be developed for each
separate forest trust. Only if the trust beneficiaries can be made better off
should consolidation with another trustbe contemplated. Additionally, the
DNR's nondeclining flow interpretation of sustained yield imposes large
opportunity costs on trust beneficiaries as measured by reductions in trust
asset values--especially when combined with excessive habitat conservation objectives.
The issue of balancing income for trust beneficiaries while
simultaneously protecting the long-term interests of the trusts is an
important related issue because a common law duty of a trustee is to make
a trust productive by generating income.12 However, a trustee must also
preserve the trust for use by future generations. At issue is the balance
between current and future beneficiaries. The duty of impartiality and
prudence requires that the trustee balance both of these competing interests
in a fair manner. While the trustee is accorded a high degree of discretion
in the matter, we believe that conservative actions taken on behalf of future

9. Id. In western Washington, these ownership groups are defined as the forest board
transfer lands (where separate harvests are calculated for each of 16 counties); the federal
grant lands and the forest board purchase lands (where separate harvests are calculated for
each of five departmental administrative regions); the Capitol Forest; and the Olympic
Experimental State Forest. See id. at 20. In eastern Washington, an even-flow harvest level is
determined separately for each of five departmental administrative regions. See id. at 21.
10. INDEP. REVIEW COMM., supra note 6, at 5, ch. 6.
11. Id.
12. See also WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.30.150(2) (West 1998) (directing the Board of
'Natural Resources to "1elstablishpolicies to insure that the acquisition, management, and
disposition of all lands and resources within the department's jurisdiction are based onsound
principles designed to achieve the maximum effective development and use of suchlands and
resources consistent with laws applicable thereto...."),
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beneficiaries should not impact current beneficiaries to the degree that is
apparent in the proposed HCP."3
In Washington State, the Legislature is the trustee of the federal
grant land trusts. 4 The DNR is composed of the Board of Natural
Resources, a departmental administrator (the Commissioner of Public
Lands), and a departmental supervisor.' The Board of Natural Resources
(composed of the governor or governor's designee, the Superintendent of
Public Instruction, the Commissioner of Public Lands, the Dean of the
College of Forest Resources of the University of Washington, the Dean of
the College of Agriculture of Washington State University, and a
representative of those counties that contain state forest lands) 16 is
empowered by the Legislature to manage and regulate activities on the
trust lands."'As the trust manager, the DNR is bound to adhere to common
law principles of trust management that apply to private trusts.18 These
principles include (a) undivided loyalty and full disclosure to the trust
beneficiaries, (b) making the trust productive while generating income for
the beneficiaries, (c) dealing with the beneficiary in an open, fair and honest
fashion, (d) keeping and rendering accounts, (e) exercising reasonable care
in managing the trust, and (f) preserving and protecting the trust in
perpetuity. 9 Undivided loyalty is taken to mean that trust assets may not
be used to pursue other state goals, no matter how laudatory they may be.'"
It also implies that trust beneficiaries must receive fair market value for the
use or sale of trust assets. 2 State courts have generally upheld these
principles so long as all applicable state and federal laws are satisfied.' In
producing income for trust beneficiaries, the trustee must carefully balance
short-term and long-term interests. As noted, income generation associated
with development of the trust's productive potential must be balanced
against preservation of the trust in the long term.
A Washington State Attorney General opinion concludes that the
Legislature's duties as trustee run separately to each of the trusts.23

13. See BARE ET AL, supra note 6, at 1-2, 45.
14. See State's Trust Responsibilities with Respect to Lands Granted by the United States
or Placed in Trust through State Legislation, Wash. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 11, Finding No. 1

(Aug. 1,1996) (hereinafter Wash. A.G.O. 1996 No. 11].
15.

See WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.30.030 (West 1998).

16. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.30.040 (West 1998).
17.
18.
19.

See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ff 43.30.040(2), (6) (West 1998).
See Wash. A.G.O. 1996 No. 11, Findings No. 14 & 16.
See id. at 13; FOREST POLICYPLAN, supranote 1, at C-4 app.C;JON A. SOUDER & SALLY
K. FARFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS: HISTORY, MANAGEMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE USE 1-4 (1996).
20. See Wash. A.G.O. 1996 No. 11, at 13-14.

21. See id.
22.
23.

See id. at 13-15 (for a list of some of these cases).
See id. at 21.
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Consolidation of trusts for management purposes is permissible where it
serves the economic interests of each trust.24 However, the trustee may not
manage trusts so that one trust benefits at the expense of another.' In
managing the trusts, the DNR "may only take into account factors
consistent with ensuring economic value and productivity...."26
As suggested above, developing an HCP for forest trust lands
requires a careful balance of fiduciary responsibilities against legally
mandated conservation objectives. In developing its HCP, the DNR
included forest trust lands representing a dozen individual trusts.
However, our research did not locate any economic analyses that were
conducted at the individual trust level and none that demonstrated that the
HCP was in the best economic interests of each separate trust.2' Further, the
economic analyses performed on the consolidated set of trusts sought to
maximize harvest volume and not asset value." Thus, the analyses were
not structured to search for management alternatives that could satisfy
habitat conservation goals at the lowest cost to the trust beneficiaries."
While the use of a volume-maximizing objective appears to run counter to
the trustee's duty of obtaining full value for the beneficiaries, it is the noneconomically justified consolidation of trusts under an HCP that is of
principal concern in this article.
The forest economics literature does not discuss the specific
problem we are addressing. There is, however, a rich literature that
discusses the allocation of joint costs when multiple-purpose projects are

24.
25.
26.

See id. at 42.
See id.
Id. at 47.
27. See HABITAT CONSERVATION

PLAN,

supra note 2, at 1.1;

NATURAL RESOURCES, SUSTAINABLE HARVEST REPORT 22 (1996)

WASH. STATE DEP'T OF

[hereinafter

SUSTAINABLE

HARVEST REPORT].
28. See id. The net present value (NPV) over the next 200 years is displayed for 12
separate forest trusts. See id.
Four of the trusts are shown to be better off if excluded from the
HCP. See id. More importantly, the NPVs displayed for each trust are simply that trust's
portion of the total NPV that emanates from the management plan for a consolidated group
of trusts. See id. Thus, it is an accounting allocation and not the result of a trust-by-trust
economic analysis.
29. It is important to recognize that all NPVs calculated by the DNR in preparing its
management plans are simply fixed sets of timber prices extended against calculated harvest
volumes. No attempt is made to maximize NPV subject to harvest flow constraints. By
maximizing harvest volume subject to nondeclining flow constraints, undue weight may be
assigned to future beneficiaries relative to present beneficiaries.
30. See, e.g., BARE ET AL, supranote 6. This report detailed the economic consequences of
the DNR HCP and offered several alternatives that generate significantly more economic
value to trust beneficiaries while also satisfying habitat conservation requirements. See id.
Treatment alternatives described and evaluated in the report were largely dismissed by the
department.
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involved.3 ' Although various cost allocation techniques have been
advanced, 2 most authors conclude that, from an economic perspective, the
allocation is arbitrary.' And, as pointed out several years ago, "there is no
need to allocate costs in undertaking an economic evaluation of production
alternatives."' Nonetheless, allocation ofjoint costs may be relevant where
cost sharing or reimbursement is required. Yet "[ilt is important to stress
that cost allocation and benefit-cost analysis have very little in common.
Allocation is an essential part of the financial analysis of projects, while
benefit-cost analysis is the main component of the economic analysis."'
From this, we can conclude that forest management plans for individual
trusts, as well as for a consolidated set of trusts, must pass a benefit-cost
test to be further considered. Allocating benefits realized as a result of
consolidation arises during the requisite financial analysis that must follow.
This article addresses the problems that appear when individual forest
trusts are managed under a consolidated management plan such as an
HCP. We propose a procedure that allows the benefits and costs of a
consolidated plan such as an HCP to be properly evaluated given the
common law responsibilities of a trust manager who must also satisfy
legally mandated conservation objectives. Our procedure defines the

31. See, e.g., John G. Hof& Richard C. Field, On the Possibility of Using Joint Cost Allocation
in Forest Management Decision Making, 33 FOREST SCL 1035 (1987); Doug Rideout & John Hof,
Cost Sharing in Multiple Use Forestry: A Game Theoretic Approach, 33 FOREST SC. 81 (1987);
Douglas Rideout & John Hof, Allocating Joint Costs in Applied Forestry, 2 W. J. APPUED
FORESTRY 45 (1987).

32. See D. Rideout&J.E. Wagner, Testing Cost-Sharing Techniques on a Multiple-Use Timber
Sale, 23 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 285, 285 (1998). The authors review six allocation
procedures using five criteria. See id. They conclude that "no technique generally conforms
with each of the allocation criteria listed, and that allocations can be highly variable across
techniques that are applied in the same situation." Id. at 295. The most widely used allocation
technique known as "separable costs/remaining benefits" is similar to that proposed in this
article. Id. at 289-90. While not the best performing of the six tested allocation procedures, it
appears to be a satisfactory criterion. See id. at 293. In allocating joint costs, this criterion first
identifies separable costs that can be attributed to a multiple use product or purpose. See id.
at 289-90. Then, the remaining common costs are allocated to the purposes or products in
proportion to the remaining benefits for an individual purpose as a fraction of all remaining
benefits. See id. at 290. In evaluating the advantages of a consolidated trust management plan
versus separate management plans for each individual trust, gains from consolidated
management (which are similar to common costs) should be allocated to individual trusts in
proportion to each trust's constraint-induced reduction in benefits relative to the total
constraint-induced reduction in benefits for all trusts.
33. See Michael D. Bowes & John V. Krutilla, Cost Allocation in Efficient Multiple-Use
Management: A Comment, 77 J.FORESTRY 419,419 (1979).
34. MICHAEL D. BOWES & JOHN V. KRUTILLA, MULTIPLE-USE MANAGEMENT: THE
ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FORESTLANDS 295 (1989).
35. OTTO ECKSTEIN, WATER-RSOURCE DEVELOPMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF PROJECT
EVALUATION 262 (1958).
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minimum set of standards that satisfy these requirements while also
satisfying the trustee's duty to obtain full value for the beneficiaries.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM AND AN OVERVIEW OF A
PROCEDURAL SOLUTION
In order for an HCP (or any forest management plan) across a
collection of trusts to be in the best interests of each individual trust, it must
allow each individual trust to benefit, though each need not benefit
equally.' As trust manager, the DNR is directed to manage all state trust
lands to achieve the maximum effective development.' Any adopted
management plan must be in the economic interests of each trust.' Still, the
trustee should not maximize current income at the expense of long-term
interests. The trustee has the duty to make the trust productive-but must
also preserve the trust for future beneficiaries." These competing duties
become even more complex when regulatory and/or operational
constraints applied to the collective set of trusts have different cost impacts
on individual trusts.
In light of the above considerations, a rigorous equity criterion
must be established for allocating to individual trusts those cost or benefit
impacts resulting from collective management. The trust manager should
always undertake analyses of individual trusts, even if only to show that
those individual trusts are not being impaired by collective management.
Below, a four-step procedure is suggested to achieve this equitable
allocation.
First, a forest management plan should be developed for each
individual trust in the absence of regulatory 0 and/or operational"

36. See Wash. A.G.O. 1996 No. 11, at 42,44.
37. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.30.150(2) (West 1998).

38. See Wash. A.G.O. 1996 No. 11, at42.
39.
40.

See id. at 45.
Regulatory constraints refer to statutory requirements that (a) certain forestlands be

excluded from timber management operations (i.e., unstable slopes, wetland buffers, streambank buffers, wildlife reserves), (b)regeneration be undertaken within a fixed time period
following completion of a harvest, (c)certain forest practices be modified (i.e., clear cuts be
shaped to appear more natural, down woody debris and standing dead trees be left for

wildlife following a harvest, no controlled burning when air conditions are unfavorable), and
(d) to produce timber on a sustained yield basis. See SUSTAINABLE HARVESr REPoRT, supranote
27, at 10-15, 17-18.
41. Operational constraints refer to requirements established by the trust manager that
(a) conservatively interpret sustained yield such that timberharvests may never decrease from
those realized today (i.e., nondeclining flow), (b)reserve forestland from harvest for scientific
study, (c) set harvest ages beyond those that yield the greatest economic benefit to the
beneficiary, and (d) engage in forest practices that exceed minimum governmental
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constraints. This unconstrained forest management plan maximizes
benefits for each individual trust. It also maximizes aggregate benefits
when summed over all trusts. This step establishes a fair asset share for
each trust in the absence of constraints. Management plans developed in
step one form a baseline against which all other plans may be measured.
Second, minimal necessary regulatory and/or operational
constraints are incorporated into the forest management plans for each
individual trust in order to determine the magnitude of the constraintinduced reduction in benefits. Both regulatory and operational constraints
will result in different impacts on individual trusts due to differences in
timber age class structure, site productivity, and geographical location of
trust acres relative to other ownerships. Overly restrictive constraints will
exacerbate the reduction of benefits to trust beneficiaries.
Third, a comparable set of minimum regulatory and/or operational
constraints is incorporated into the forest management plan developed for
the collective set of trusts. Under collective management, the forest
management plan derived for each individual trust is dependent on the
management plan for every other trust. Further, the aggregate set of
benefits when constraints are applied across the collective set of trusts
should be larger than when equivalent constraints are applied at the
individual trust level. This is a result of the interdependence of the different
timber age class distributions of the trusts and the impact this has on the
time path of harvest flows. In effect, constraints imposed on any trust may
be offset by the flexibility gained by another trust. Any economic benefits
that result from collective management should be allocated to individual
trusts equitably.
The Washington State Attorney General opinion suggests that all
trusts should be at least as well off under collective management as they
are under individual trust-by-trust management.' 2 That is, each trust's
economic benefits should not decrease as a consequence of collective
management. While we concur that this litmus test must be passed, we
believe that the appropriate criterion for equitable treatment is to allocate
any increased benefits arising from collective management in proportion
to the reduction in benefits induced per step two versus benefits associated
with step one.
Fourth, an HCP is developed for the collective set of trusts.
Consistent with the Attorney General opinion, if each trust benefits under
the HCP relative to the consolidated plan developed as part of step three,
then no trust is made worse off by the HCP under collective management.
If, however, a trust is worse off under the collective HCP, either it can be

regulations. See SUSTAINABLE HARVEST REPORT, supra note 27, at 25-26.
42. See Wash. A.G.O. 1996 No. 11, at 21-22.
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eliminated from the collective set (and resort to the management plan
developed in step two) or an alternative HCP can be found in which it is
not worse off. In any event, each individual trust must be better off under
the HCP than under collective management per step three.'
As described earlier, we believe that the collective increase in
benefits from step four (relative to step three) should be allocated
proportionally to reductions in individual trustbenefits per step two. Then,
each trust is always at least as well, if not better, off, and benefit increases
are proportional to the individual trust constraint-induced decreases per
step two. Our equity criterion follows the principle of Pareto efficiency,
which states that a solution is efficient if no trust can be made better off
without at least one other trust being made worse off."
A DETAILED PROPOSAL FOR ALLOCATING THE COSTS OF
REGULATIONS ON INDIVIDUAL TRUST ASSET VALUES
Step 1. Unconstrained Trust Benefit Maximization
The maximum net present value (NPV) performance for each
individual trust is determined in the absence of regulatory and/or
operational constraints. Timber stands are scheduled for harvest at the
rotation age and assigned land management treatment strategy that
maximizes the NPV for the forest land management plan under
consideration. This assumes that each individual trust is a price taker and
has no significant impact on the market price for timber. This harvest
sequence may not offer the desired revenue stability over time and may not
be operationally practical. It does, however provide a baseline and an asset
value share for each trust relative to the aggregate total of all trusts in the
absence of operational and/or regulatory constraints. It also provides a
baseline that facilitates measurement of benefit reductions that result from
the imposition of constraints per step two.
In the absence of constraints, there is no difference between what
is best for each trust analyzed individually or as part of a collective set.
Thus, management plans can be determined independently on a trust-bytrust basis. A plan so determined and subsequently aggregated across all
trusts generally will produce a more stable revenue flow than one focused

43. If a trust is removed from the collective set per step four, a new analysis is required
at step three in order to establish a new basis of comparison. It is important to note that even
if all trusts benefit from the collective HCP, it is unlikely that each will benefit equally or that
each will benefit in proportion to their benefit reductions per step two.
44. See HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 225 (3d ed. 1992).
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on an individual trust. If trusts are of sufficient size that changes in their
harvest level will affect timber prices relative to other trusts, the
maximization must take the elasticity of the demand curve for timber into
account. This is not likely to be a significant factor for most individual
trusts but it could be for joint trust management. In any case, it is not
further pursued in this article.
Maximization of the NPV is selected as the appropriate
management objective as it is most compatible with the trustee's charge to
maximize effective development of the trust lands over the long run. It
differs from maximizing current income because it considers preservation
of the trust for future beneficiaries. Management strategies considered in
the development of all forest management plans or HCPs are assumed to
incorporate adequate provisions for immediate restocking of harvested
acres and suitable protection of the productive capacity of the timber land
itself.4
The maximum NPV of each trust is determined individually and
is then aggregated to produce a total asset value shown as NPV 1 in figure
1 (demonstrating a set of two trusts). This value represents the aggregate
NPV of all trusts. Since there are no regulatory or operational constraints,
the forest management plan that maximizes benefits for each individual
trust also maximizes benefits for all trusts when considered collectively.
As an example, consider the three hypothetical trusts of table 1.
Trust A is composed of over-rotation age timber but is capable of
generating high near-term revenues, Trust B contains a balanced
distribution of timber age classes and is capable of producing a relatively
sustained yield of revenue, and Trust C is composed of a young forest with
high potential for future revenue but low revenue generation in the near
term. All three trusts are assumed to be equal in regard to long-term land
productivity, but have varying levels of riparian and old forest habitat that
must be protected. Due to its old forest character, Trust A is expected to be
most limited by regulatory constraints. In the absence of regulatory and
operational constraints, each trust managed individually generates
maximum NPVs of 100, 70, and 35 (million $),respectively. The aggregate
NPV from all three trusts is 205 (million $).
Steps 2 and 3. Individually and Collectively Constrained Trust Benefit
Maximization
Minimum regulatory and necessary operational constraints are
applied to each trust individually (step two) and, subsequently, to all trusts
collectively (step three). These constraints include all applicable federal,
45.

Seesupranote41.
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state, and local regulations and laws. If the impact of regulatory constraints
is to be treated differently from operational constraints, it is necessary to
impose both types sequentially in order to measure their separate impacts
on asset (NPV) values. The introduction of regulatory or operational
constraints into the analysis reduces the maximum NPV performance
relative to step one whether each trust is considered individually or
whether all trusts are considered collectively. The reduction in NPV
between steps two and three versus step one measures the cost of the
constraints.
It is likely that the aggregation of NPV reductions resulting from
constraints applied at the individual trust level (step two) will be greater
than those derived iftrusts are managed collectively (step three). Managing
across a larger set of choices allows more tradeoffs that lower collective
costs. This assumes that the same set of constraints is applied in both
instances. Further, these constraints may impose differential cost impacts
between trusts. If the constraints are imposed on a collection of trusts, those
trusts that are forced to deviate furthest from their unconstrained schedule
will lose more benefits, thus resulting in higher costs relative to the other
trusts. No trust can increase its NPV at steps two or three beyond the level
determined in step one, but it is possible that some trusts may be
unaffected by the constraints and achieve their unconstrained value. In any
event, it is likely that the imposition of constraints will generate unequal
treatment across some of the trusts.
Examples of regulatory constraints imposed in steps two or three
are those that can be found associated with the Washington State Forest
Practices Act" and the Endangered Species Act of 1973. These include the
need for owl circles to protect the northern spotted owl, riparian and
wetlands buffers to protect fish and other stream resources, and the
protection of marbled murrelet habitat." Operational constraints such as
nondeclining harvest flow, placing some acres in an unmanaged reserve
status, and the need to satisfy various DNR policies relative to the
determination of sustainable harvest levels should be analyzed separately
in order to measure their impacts on asset value and to justify their need.
In step two (see figure 1), we assume that minimal necessary regulatory
and/or operational constraints are imposed on the trusts individually. This
leads to an aggregate NPV denoted as NPV2 and a cost induced by the
constraints (i.e., a reduction in NPV) defined as C2 =NPV 1 - NPV2 . In step
three, the trusts are analyzed collectively producing NPV3. Both NPV2 (the

46. Forest Practices Act of 1974, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 76.09.010 to 900 (West 1994).
47. Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. ff 1531-43 (1994).
48. See Wash. Admin. Code § 222-16-085 (1999); HABrrATCONsERVATlON PLANs pra note
2, at A5-8 to A5-9, app.5.
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aggregate of the individual trust NPVs) and/or NPV3 (the collective trust
case) are < NPV 1 . As shown in figure 1, the reduction in benefits induced
by the constraints at either step two or three may be borne differentially by
the trusts in both cases. The increment between each individual trust's NPV
in step two, versus each trust's share of the collective NPV in step three, is
a direct result of the collective analysis.
The increase in benefits (arising from collective management at
step three versus step two) is allocated to each individual trust in
proportion to the constraint-induced reduction in benefits per step two.
Thus, the benefits that accrue to any individual trust arising from collective
management must be considered. Given that exemptions exist for some
individual trusts, the equitable allocation of increased collective benefits
may produce an increase in benefits for every trust, even though some
trusts may not have been better off under collective management before
benefit allocation. Also, equitable allocation may result in a greater
collective increase in benefits (with each trust at least as well off) than
would be attained by eliminating a previously unaffected trust from the
collective pool of trusts.
The results of step two (table 1) illustrate that while each trust's
NPV is reduced as regulatory and operational constraints are imposed,
they are not impacted equally. Each trust's constraint-induced costs are 20,
5, and 4 (million $) which translate into reductions in asset value of 20, 7,
and 11 percent, respectively.
Each trust's share of the collective NPV from step three shows that
it is better off under collective management relative to individual trust
management per step two. Gains of 5,2, and 1 (million $),respectively, are
shown in table 1. Collective management results in NPV gains of 6,3, and
3 percent, respectively, relative to the results in step two. However, our
equitable treatment of these collective gains is to allocate them to each trust
in proportion to the constraint-induced reductions per step two. This
allocation is described in detail following a discussion of step four.
Step 4. Collectively Constrained Trust Benefits under an HCP
An economic analysis similar to that discussed under step three is
repeated under the assumption of a collective HCP lacking current
regulatory constraints.l It is assumed that all operational constraints are
held constant across steps three and four. In comparing the results from
steps two or three with step four, the principle that individual trusts should
benefit or lose equally under a collective HCP is almost impossible to fulfill.

49. Because an HCP for an individual trust may not be geographicaUy or operationally
feasible, we assume throughout that only a collective HCP analysis is performed.
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The Attorney General opinion only requires individual trusts to be at least
as well off under a collective HCP as under no HCP. o However, an
equitable allocation of the resulting increases in benefits under collective
HCP management is to allocate them to each trust in proportion to the
initial constraint-induced reduction in benefits that made collective
management desirable.
In figure 1, step four, NPV4 (associated with a collective HCP) is
assumed to be > NPV 3 (associated with collective regulatory constraints).
This is the direct result of additional management flexibility achieved
through the HCP relative to the stricter regulatory constraints per step
three. It means that the trusts benefit collectively under an HCP relative to
the constraints embedded in the collective regulatory analysis per step
three. However, each trust's share of the increased benefits relative to step
three is likely to be increased disproportionally. We believe that this is
inequitable because it implies that one trust can be made worse off if
another trust does not participate in the collective HCP. Our equitable
distribution of the increase in benefits derived from a collective HCP is to
distribute it proportionally to the constraint-induced benefit reductions
derived at step two. It is also necessary to ensure that each trust is at least
as well off under the HCP as it was under the collective regulatory
constraint plan of step three.
Summary and Discussion of Steps I through 4
After the analyses defined in steps one through four are completed,
the following comparisons and rationalizations are necessary in order to
decide whether a particular forest management plan (or HCP) is in the best
interests of any, or all, trusts:
a) NPV3 is compared with NPV2 to determine whether there is a
collective increase in benefits relative to individual trust management
implying that collective management is worth considering further. In our
hypothetical example (table 1), the benefits of collective management under
regulatory constraints provide a net gain of eight (million $) relative to
individual trust management per step two.
b) Each individual trust must be as well off when considered as
part of the collective set as it is when considered separately or it should not
be considered as part of the collective set. If any trust is disadvantaged by
collective management (i.e., NPVi3 < NPVi 2 ), the disadvantaged trust can
be eliminated from the collective pool, and the analysis in step three rerun.
From table 1, we see that each trust benefits from collective
management-thus, none is a candidate for removal from the collective

50. See Wash. A.G.O. 1996 No. 11, at 37.
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base. 1 While this satisfies the criterion offered in the attorney general's
opinion,52 it does not provide trusts with the maximum benefit they should
derive from collective management. Alternatively, the trusts that benefit
from collective management can compensate the disadvantaged trust to
keep it in the pool because, without the latter, the trusts remaining in the
collective pool suffer increased costs.
Using our equitable fiduciary management principle, increased
benefits resulting from collective management at step three should be
allocated to individual trusts in proportion to their benefit reductions from
step two relative to step one. This allocated benefit (C'i3 ) is defined as C'i3
= (Ci2/C 2 ) * C3 and is always less than or equal to Ci2 for all i trusts. Note,
Ci2 = (NPVil - NPVi2) for all i trusts and C3 = (NPV1 - NPV3 ) C2 .
Using the above definition of allocated benefits (C'i3), the allocated
NPV'i3 for each trust is computed as NPV'i 3 = NPVij - C'i3. This allocation
impacts each trust in our hypothetical example as shown in table 1. Trust
A gains 0.5 (million $) in NPV, Trust B loses 0.6 (million $), and Trust C
gains 0.1 (million $) relative to gains and losses before allocation but after
consolidation. The total allocated NPV' 3 remains at 184 (million $).
c) If the collective benefit NPV4 is not larger than NPV3 , a
collective HCP is not in the best economic interests of the trusts. For the
hypothetical illustration, each collective trust is better off under the HCP.
Steps three and four could be conducted as a risk analysis to reflect the
impact of uncertain future regulations (i.e., more than one set of minimum
regulatory assumptions changing over time with probabilities for each
outcome). It is possible that NPV4 might not exceed NPV3 under static
current regulations but could under conditions that include the addition of
future regulations that the HCP precludes. In such a case, an HCP would
be in the best economic interests of the trusts.
d) Under an HCP, C'i4 = (Ci2/C2) * C4 for all i trusts and is always
less than or equal to Ci2. The terms C'i 3 and C'i 4 represent the increased
benefits arising from collective management, and the terms NPV'i3 and
NPV'i 4 represent the allocated NPVs. s At this point, the analysis closely
parallels the discussion under (b) and, therefore, is not repeated herein.
From table 1, each trust in our example benefits under a collective
HCP by 7, 2, and 2 (million $), respectively, relative to the results at step
three. However, use of the equitable allocation formula shown above

51. Trusts once dropped from the pool theoretically are eligible to reenter at a later point
in the analysis, although this may not be considered for practical reasons.
52. See Wash. A.G.O. 1996 No. 11, at 44.
53. The following two equations formally express and summarize the calculations
required:
either, NPV'ii = NPVil - C'. with C'. (Ci2/C 2 )*C for all i trusts and j = 3,
4; or NPV'ij 2 NPVilt- [(NPVi - NPi 2 )/(NPV
2)]*(NPV - NPVj)
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results in Trust A gaining 1.1 (million $) in NPV, Trust B losing 0.7 (million
$), and Trust C losing 0.4 (million $) relative to gains and loses before
allocation but after consolidation under a HCP. The total allocated NPV' 4
remains at 195 (million $).
EXAMINATION OF DNR ANALYSIS
Analysis undertaken during preparation of the DNR HCP did not
include a valid unconstrained starting point for facilitating a trust-by-trust
economic analysis.' Further, DNR did not determine the magnitude of
trust benefit reductions in order to satisfy minimum regulatory and/or
operational constraints on an individual trust basis per step two. While
collective gains under a proposed HCP, per step four, were determined by
the DNR, they were not compared with results from steps two and three.
Instead, the DNR compared the results from step four with those of a
collective analysis of all trusts undertaken using regulatory requirements
that exceeded statutory minimums and operational constraints such as
nondeclining harvest flow (i.e., a modified step three). As a consequence,
the NPV for 33 percent of the trusts was lower under the proposed HCP
than under consolidated management. ' No attempt was made to remove
trusts from the collective set to see whether this situation was in their best
economic interests. For these reasons, we believe that the DNR could not
conclude that their HCP proposal was in the best economic interests of
each individual trust.5
When nondeclining harvest flow constraints are imposed across
the collection of trusts, there are differential impacts on the NPV for each
trust, and nondeclining flow will not be achieved on a trust-by-trust basis.
If nondeclining flow constraints were imposed on individual trusts, the
NPV loss in the aggregate could be enormous. Under current and proposed
planning, the DNR imposes nondeclining harvest flow constraints on
smaller and smaller planning areas, leading to unequal reductions in the
value to the trusts. The addition of operationally-based habitat constraints
and treating some forest acres as set-aside reserves increases these losses
significantly.

54. See BARE Er AL., supranote 6, at 5; SUSTAINABLE HARVEST REPORT, supra note 27, at 10.
55. See SUSTAINABLE HARVEST REPORT, supra note 27, at 22.
56. See BARE ET AL, supra note 6, at iv.
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ALLOCATION OF TRUST REVENUES
The above-described equity principle also can be used to allocate
annual net revenues (REV) that arise from collective management.' Each
individual trust's revenues and management costs are accounted for
separately in the determination of REVjm REV'iim represents the fair share
allocation of actual annual net revenues (REVim) under collective
management. The difference between the allocated net revenue and the
actual net revenue (i.e., REV'iJm - REVijm) represents the adjustment
required under the proposed equity criterion.
For this proposal to work properly there should be a high degree
of correlation between the plan and the actual implementation of it. If not,
some trust beneficiary may feel that it is not receiving its proper share of
revenues under the allocation criterion. For the hypothetical example
shown in table 1, use of the equity criterion leads to an allocated net
revenue gain of 1.4 (thousand $) for Trust A, 1.0 (thousand $) for Trust B,
and a reduction of 2.4 (thousand $)for Trust C in year "m." Although some
trusts increase their allocated net revenue share while others lose, the
allocation is the trust's fair share under our long-term equity criterion. Each
trust would not be expected to gain or lose allocated net revenue
consistently over time. Instead, the fair share allocation would change as
actual gross revenues and costs change.
CONCLUSION
The consolidated management of individual forest trusts raises
serious questions of equity and fair treatmentbetween trusts. Common law
principles of trust management include undivided loyalty, preservation of
the trust in perpetuity, and making the trust productive. The proposed
approach for dealing with these issues begins with the determination of a
forest plan at the individual trust level with the highest possible asset value
under conditions of no harvest flow or regulatory constraints (step one). As
harvest flow and minimum regulatory constraints are incorporated, they
will likely generate unequal impacts on individual trusts.
A management plan developed for a consolidated set of trusts
under minimum regulations (step three) or an HCP (step four) requires use
of an equity criterion to ensure that trusts benefit proportionately. We
propose that this criterion be based on the amount trusts would lose under

57. After calculating NPV'ij, the fair share of annual net revenue that trust i receives for
year m under collective management can be calculated as REV'.
where REVim is the total actual gross revenue less actual costs
for all I trusts for year m with j = 3,4.

= REV-m *NPV'i / NPV.
nrm
coaltive managemeni

Summer 2000]

STATE FOREST TRUSTS

495

constraint-induced management at the individual trust level (step two). In
this regard, it is first necessary to show that each trust is at least as well off
under collective management (step three) as it is under individual trust-bytrust management (step two). Second, the same comparison is made for
each trust under assumptions of a collective HCP (step four) versus
collective management under regulatory minimums (step three). If both
conditions are satisfied, the joint increased benefits achieved under
collective management should be allocated in proportion to the constraintinduced individual trustbenefit reductions (step two). Under this proposal,
each trust may not benefit equally from consolidated management, but
each will benefit in proportion to its contribution to the benefits of
collective management. The proposed equity criterion also can be used to
allocate annual net revenues (received under collective management) to
individual trusts.
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Table 1 Hypothetical illustration of Equitable Trust Treatment

Step 0)
1
2
3
4
Wo
NPVo
C',
NPVw
REVNm.
NPVwI NPV4
REVIN.
Notes:
1)
2)

Old
Forest
Trust A
100
80
85
92

(Trust values In million $)
Sustained
Young
Forest
Yield
NPV
Trust C
Trust B
205
35
70
31
176
65
184
32
ST
195
34
69

14.5
85.5
6.9
93.1

3A6
66A
1.7
68.3

2.9
32.1
1A
33.6

75
47.7%
7GA

56
35.0%
66.0

30
17.2%
27.6

C2 =29; C3s 21; C4 10
4
CAI 2 0;C==S;Ccu:

21
184
10
195

Management Situation
Unconstrained, individual
Constrained, Individual
Constrained, collective
iCIP, collective
Allocated
Allocated
Allocated
Allocated

benefits
NPVs
beneft
NPVs

160
Net revenue (' 000 $) yearm
100.0% Fair share proportion
Aliocated net revenue ( 000 $)
160
year m
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Figare 1.Conceptual Approach for Allocating Joint Trust Benefits
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